Here private judgement may work

Text by professor Timo Airaksinen

Finally, "[s]ome cases there are so plain and obvious to judge of that they may safely be trusted to the prudence of every reasonable man." (PO 19). Here private judgement may work, but these are exceptions. However, the most important question concerning the relationship of right reason and private judgement is this: "It cannot be denied that right reason doth require some common stated rule or measure, whereby subjects ought to shape their submission to the Supreme Power." (PO 20). 

Berkeley recognizes only two possible guidelines of right reason: the principle of non-resistance or loyalty and the idea of public good. The second is much too vague to be useful (PO 20) and, hence, we need a "determinate, agreed, common measure of loyalty," if we hope properly to organize our social life. (PO 20). Rational agents personally and individually accept the duty of loyalty.

An additional problem is that some natural processes and conditions may hinder the realization of the divine moral laws in the sense of the Humean artificial and contextual conditions of justice, that is.[i] In such cases it is as if the laws of justice did not apply. In some nasty natural circumstances, I must kill one person to save many, or is this murder? If it is not, what is it? If moral laws are like natural laws, I am, perhaps, naturally obliged to kill one person to save many, as the body is naturally obliged by gravity, but only if to kill one person is in this very situation the moral thing to do. But how do I know? I need to deliberate about it; perhaps I suppose that a consequentialist or utilitarian perspective is the correct one. I may then conclude that saving one person is correct

[i] David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), 3.2.2.16.